In the process of development each zone is gradually transformed from a net importer of resources to a net exporter.
3. If the economy as a whole is in a variable state, then the development pattern depends on the expectation formation regime. If the economy is characterized by a decline of either the utility level or of the interest rate, the housing stock will still grow continuously, but the other characteristics of development specified in 2 will not necessarily be valid. If the economy is characterized by an increase either in the utility level or in the interest rate and if the developers are myopic, the housing stock may begin to decline (unlike the pattern described in 1 above) after the early stages of growth, and may eventually even be abandoned altogether. The effect of an increase in the accessibility cost of the zone or a decrease in the productivity of producing the non-housing output is similar to that of an increase in the interest rate.
4. An increase in utility coupled with an improvement in the transportation system, especially in the outer rings, is likely to result in the eventual deterioration of the city center and in the development of the suburbs.
In addition, it is shown that: 5. In the case of perfect foresight, the present value of the net export of the city (surplus) is fully capitalized in the land values plus the value of the existing stock of housing. (The benefit of a project can therefore be measured by the increase in the value of the housing stock and land values in the area.) In the case of perfect foresight, the competitive allocation is consistent with the Pareto optimum.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model, its underlying assamptions, and the equilibrium conditions, as well as the relations between the surplus of the city and the real estate values, and between the competitive allocation and the Pareto optimum. Section 3 discusses the development pattern of a given zone when all exogenous variables are constant. Section 4 is devoted to an analysis of the spatial growth pattern. The effect of changes in the exogenous variable on the development pattern is the subject of Section 5. Reservations and possible extensions of the model are discussed in Section 6.
THE MODEL
The model is designed to characterize long-run spatial development in a small city within a system of open cities under a competitive regime. The cities are open in the sense that households move costlessly between any pair of cities and have perfect knowledge of the wages and prices prevailing in each city of the system.
The urban population is composed of homogeneous households (in terms of both preferences and initial holdings). Each household supplies one unit of labor services per period. Land and housing capital stock are owned by absentee landlords.4 4The assumption of absentee landlords is convenient but not consequential to the results (see Section 6).
The city is monocentric. In the center there is an export-import terminal, where the production of a composite good is concentrated. It is surrounded by residential zones. Each residential zone is denoted by i; i = 1,2, . . . , such that zone i = n is closer to the center than i = n + 1. This spatial layout can be explained by the extremely high cost of shipping the composite good within the city, or by the nuisance created by the production process and the existence of minimum environmental standards. 5 The spatial pattern of the city generates commuting costs. Let Ti(t) units of a composite good be required to transport a worker from residential zone i to the center, where he works, in period t. Commuting costs increase with distance. Thus, T (t) < T +I(t). It is assumed that the cost of transportation is independent of the volume of traffic (no congestion effect). 6 A unit of labor in period t produces w(t) units of the composite good. Thus, total production of the composite good in the city equals w(t)N(t), where N(t) is the size of the city population in period t. 7 Since the city is small, the welfare level, u(t), attainable elsewhere in the country, is exogeneously determined. Costless migration implies that households are attracted to the city only if they can achieve there the utility level u(t). The utility level of a household depends on its consumption of housing services Bi(t), and of a composite good Zi(t).8 The consumption of housing services is measured by the quantity of housing stock (e.g. square feet of net floor space) occupied per period. The relative price of housing services, in terms of the composite good, Pi(t), depends on the location of the house. Hence, given the utility level, u(t), the compensated demands are Zi(t) = z(Pi(t),u(t)) and
Bi(t) = b(Pi(t),u(t)).
A household earns its marginal productivity, w(t), and spends its income on the composite good Zi(t), housing services Pi(t)Bi(t), and transportation Ti(t). Thus, its budget constraint is10 ( 
1) z(Pi(t), u(t)) + Pi(t)b(Pi(t), u(t)) + Ti(t) = w(t).
5We avoid the more realistic explanation-economies of scale and agglomeration-as these imply that the optimum city cannot be sustained competitively. The concluding section discusses the extension of the model to incorporate these aspects. 6As this assumption is unrealistic, further extensions of the model should consider this point, as well as the investment in improving transportation (see Section 6).
7The implications of the model are unchanged if we assume that the composite good is produced by a linear homogeneous function of labor and capital and that the supply of capital is infinitely elastic.
8The composite good consumed may be different from that produced locally. For example, the city may specialize in an export composite good, the demand for which is infinitely elastic. The prices of both are assumed to be unitary. This can explain the assumption that the shipment of the composite good produced is extremely expensive while the shipment of the composite good consumed is not, and thus justify the concentration of production.
9Note that rent and price of housing services are considered synonymous. 10Note that the budget constraint implies that the city residents live on their current income and all landlords are absentees. Relaxation of this assumption is discussed in Section 6.
The total supply of housing services at any given period is equal to the housing stock Hi(t). The change in the latter is the net construction. The production function of net construction (net addition to the stock) is assumed to be homogeneous of first degree in the stock Hi(t), the composite good input Ci(t), and a predetermined supply of land Li(t).11 Accordingly, (2) Hi~( t) h h(Hi (t), Ci (t), Li (t)), where hj denotes differentiation of h( ) with respect to thej variable. Thus, our model allows for decline, expansion, and maintenance of the housing stock at a constant level. The marginal rate of depreciation, (-aH/aH), is (-h ). We assume that this rate is a nondecreasing function of the stock. The marginal productivities of land and the composite good are assumed to be decreasing. The marginal productivity of the composite good is assumed to be decreasing with the housing stock, reflecting the increasing difficulty of adding new units of housing as density increases.'2 Now, consider a landlord who owns all land and buildings in zone i and is both a developer and a supplier of housing services there. Given the initial stock of housing, Hi(T), the expected rates of discount, r(t), and prices, Pi(t) for t> T, 1 lAccording to this specification the rate of change of the stock is independent of age. This may perhaps be realistic with respect to brick and concrete houses but not with respect to frame houses.
'2The function h(-) can be considered a transformation function. Thus, hI < 0 and h11 ? 0 reflect the weak concavity of the function. In a conventional growth model, the relation between H and h is linear. In our model, the relation is generalized to take into account the adverse effect of density on maintenance, congestion, and pollution costs (for a more detailed discussion see Hochman and Pines [13] ). These effects are also reflected in h2l, h3l < 0. The presence of the costs of adjustment is reflected in h22 < 0. The conventional rationale for the costs of adjustment (see Lucas [14] ) is relevant to our case as well. Additional arguments for including adjustment costs are elaborated in our earlier paper. the landlord maximizes over Hi(t) and Ci(t): Given the (exogenous) utility level, u(t), and productivity, w(t), the price of housing, Pi(t), is determined for each zone by (1). Given Pi(t) and the stock of housing, Hi(t), the number of households accommodated in each zone and in the city as a whole is determined by (11) and (12) .
The change in the housing stock depends on the expectation formation regime. Two extreme regimes are considered in the following discussion: myopic or naive expectations, and perfect foresight. According to the first, the developer considers the current price and discount rate to prevail forever. He continuously modifies his expectations and therefore his plan, in accordance with the changes in the current price and interest rate. In the second case, Bellman's optimization principle implies that the plan does not change with time.
In the case of perfect foresight, some basic relations can be established between the surplus of the city (to be defined hereafter) and city real-estate values, and between the competitive allocation and Pareto optimum allocation.
The total production of the composite good by the city work force X(t), is:
(13) X(t) = N(t)w(t).

The city's current surplus or exports, S(t), is (14) S(t) = X(t)-{Nj(t)[z(Pj(t),u(t)) + Ti(t)] + Ci(t)}.
It follows from (1), (11), (12), (13), and (14) that (15) S(t) = (HiPi-C).
Hence, multiplying both sides by e-rt, integrating between T and oo, and summing over i, we have: PROOF: The necessary conditions of the optimization problem specified above are identical to the equilibrium conditions (1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (8a), (8b), (9), (lOa), (lOb), (11), (12).
Q.E.D.
Now define a competitive allocation in the economy as a whole as one where every worker is accommodated in one of the predetermined potential city sites. Formally, the above competitive allocation is defined by (1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (8) PROOF: (a) Add a superscriptj to denote a potential city. Then, consider the maximization of V* = Eje -rtSJ (t) dt over pi}(t), Ci/(t), Hi (t), Li (t), Ni/(t), NJ(t), XJ(t) subject to (2), (3), (6), (7), (11), (12), (13), and (14) where u(t) is evaluated at its equilibrium value.
Relations (1)-(3), (6), (8)- (13), which describe the competitive equilibrium, can be shown to be consistent with the necessary conditions of the above maximization problem. It follows that the solution to the above maximization problem is identical to the competitive allocation. In particular, the solution for NiJ(t) is identical to the corresponding equilibrium function of time. Thus, we can use (17) as an additional constraint without changing the solution to the maximization problem. Consequently, given the equilibrium utility u(t) and the predetermined population size N(t), the present value of the total urban surplus, V*, is maximized as argued in the proposition.
Part (b) follows from part (a) (see Hochman [11] ).
THE GROWTH PATTERN OF A GIVEN ZONE WHEN THE ECONOMY IS IN STEADY STATE
In this section we assume that the economy as a whole is in a steady state, such that the utility u(t) and the discount rate r(t) are constant. We also assume that the transportation costs, T(t), and productivity w(t) do not vary with time. Thus, ui(t) = w(t) = r(t) = T(t) = 0. In this case the plans of a landlord with naive expectations and of one with perfect foresight coincide.
We shall derive the growth pattern in a given zone by examining the phase diagram corresponding to the necessary conditions considered in the previous section. As we shall show, the properties of the qualitative solution can be The above results allow us to prove:
31It should be noted that the value of 8 fI=H= is not uniquely defined by (2) and (8a). However, our interest is in the upper limit of all the values of f8 belonging to this set, which is also the limit of /3(H)Ij=o when H approaches zero. Only this limit fulfills (19) and henceforth only this value is meant whenever f1Iff = H =0 is discussed. From (2) and (8a) it follows that strict equality in (8a) holds in this case, even though C is zero.
'4The sufficient condition h1 -hl12/h12 < 0 states that the Hamiltonian of the optimization problem, evaluated at the optimal value of Ci, is a concave function of Hi for given values of 8i. Q.E.D.
It follows from implications (b), (c)
, and (e) that for any zone being developed from scratch there exists a housing stock level Hi*, 0 < Hi* < H ?, where the zone ceases to be a net importer of resources and becomes a net exporter. 15 
THE SPATIAL PATTERN OF CITY GROWTH WHEN THE ECONOMY IS IN A STEADY STATE
In this section the effect of accessibility on the growth pattern is analyzed. To facilitate the analysis, we assume henceforth that the city is divided up into zones of equal area (i.e., Li = L, i = 1, 2, . . ., ).
15Note that in our model borrowing and lending of the composite good by landlords for an interest rate r is possible. Thus, when a zone (or the whole city) starts to develop it is a net borrower, and in the stationary state it may be a net lender. In our type of model where intragenerational transfers are impossible, intertemporal transfers (i.e., lending and borrowing) are possible only through accumulation of property (and houses). Hence, only those who may own property can lend and borrow. In the last section of this paper we allow workers to own property (positive or negative) as well and hence benefit from intertemporal transfers. Note, however, that unlike the productive sector, decisions concerning intertemporal transfers in consumption are made at the economy-wide level and hence are exogenously given to the individual city. H'(t) are the values of ,8 and H at time t corresponding to pi  (i = n, m) . Second, we show that the two equilibrium paths cannot intersect.
To prove the first part we differentiate (8a) and (9) (c) The more accessible the zone, the higher the value of its housing stock V(H(t)) (since V increases with H and P).
THE CITY GROWTH PATTERN, WHEN THE ECONOMY IS NOT IN A STEADY STATE
We begin the discussion by considering the case of naive expectations. The developer is assumed to maximize:
V(H(T)) =J '[Hi(t)Pi(T) -Ci(t)]e-r(-T) dt subject to (2), (3), (6), and (7).
First, consider the effect of an increase in Pi (s) such that up to time to, Pim prevails and thereafter Pi' where pin > pim. The change is reflected in an upward movement of locus ,B = 0 and (according to Lemma 3) an upward shift of the equilibrium path. Thus, up to to the zone is developed according to the equilibrium path corresponding to Pim. At to, AB jumps up to the equilibrium path corresponding to Pi' and the development continues according to this path.
Second, suppose that Pi increases continuously, eventually converging to P ?, P?? < oo. The paths I, II, III, and IV in Figure 3 are consistent with such a continuous increase in Pi.
A zone which is built from scratch is still developed continuously from the very beginning, as before, but ,B may now increase during some or perhaps all time intervals. Moreover, if the stock initially exceeds its stationary state level, it may first decline and then rise again towards the stationary state level (see Figure 3) .
Suppose that initially the zone is not developed since Pi is too small, such that condition (a) of Lemma 1 is not satisfied. Let Pi increase so that at some point of time, to, Pi reaches the level which satisfies this condition. From that time on, the zone is continuously developed. Q.E.D.
The effect of a continuous decrease in r converging to a finite r' is similar to that of a continuous increase of Pi converging to a finite P ?. This is reflected in Figure 3 . The effect of a continuous increase in r is similar to the effect of a continuous decrease in P as reflected in Figure 4 .
In comparing the optimal path (o.p.) which corresponds to perfect foresight with the one that corresponds to naive expectation, we observe that when p increases (r decreases): So far, we have examined how changes in r and P affect the equilibrium path. But as P itself is endogenous, we must relate Figures 3 and 4 to exogeneous variables such as u, w, and T. This can be done by using (1). Accordingly, P increases when either u or T decreases, or w increases. Thus, Figure 3 corresponds to a decrease in either u or T, or an increase in w; Figure 4 corresponds to an opposite change in these variables.
In a dynamic economy we may distinguish between two major states: (a) the steady state, and (b) a variable state approaching the steady state. The growth literature includes three basic types of dynamic models. The first is Solow's model, in which the rate of savings and regeneration are both given exogeneously. In the second type, saving is endogenous but regeneration is still exogenous (Bardhan [4] ). In the third type, the rate of regeneration is also determined endogeneously (Razin and Ben-Zion [20] ). All these models are steady-state models with a positive rate of population growth, while the utility level and level of capital per capita (and thus the rate of return) are fixed, i.e., u = r = 0. In a single city, when P = 0 the rate of population growth attains its maximum value when the city begins to develop (N(O)/N(0) = oo) and its minimum value at infinity (N(oo) = 0); in between it exhibits a monotonic decreasing function. Thus, to maintain a constant population growth throughout the economy new cities have to be developed continuously. Thus, when the economy is in a steady state, ( = r = T = 0, which implies P = 0) new cities are started continuously, and their growth pattern, characterized by P = 0, is as described above.16 When the whole economy is in a variable state approaching steady state, both utility level and property value (land and housing) per capita are changing and approaching their steady state levels. In the models mentioned above, we distinguish two characteristic cases: ui > 0, r < 0; and ui < 0, r > 0. Thus, in an economy approaching a steady state, the net effect on P cannot be ascertained a priori. Therefore we cannot determine whether Figures 3 and 4 , or a combination of the two, correspond to a growing economy.
We now turn to the pattern of spatial development when the economy is not in a steady state. Suppose that either the utility level or the interest rate or both Much more intriguing is the spatial pattern of development when the utility and/or the interest rate increase through time, in which case Pi decreases through time. Hence the boundary where the development takes place moves 16In the models of a growing economy mentioned above there are no resources whose quantity is exhaustible, such as land. If there were, then a steady state with a positive growth rate would be impossible (see, for example, Hochman and Hochman [12] , with the case of an undesirable local public good). Since land is a productive factor in our model, it is unlikely that such a steady state is indeed possible in an economy containing cities like ours. In this case, housing rents must vary with time; therefore our solution for P = 0 does not describe a real solution and is only instrumental for deriving the solutions to the other cases.
closer to the center as time passes. In the process of development, the housing stock accumulated beyond this stationary-state boundary deteriorates, decreases, and eventually vanishes. It may be abandoned even before it completely vanishes if the rent falls to zero fast enough.
This spatial pattern is not characteristic of that observed in many growing metropolitan areas. On the contrary, the center often deteriorates while the fringe is developed and the boundary moves further out. This can be explained by a simultaneous increase in u and a decrease in Pi, coupled with a decrease in Ti, especially at the outer rings. The increase in u may imply a process of growth followed by deterioration throughout the city, but the relative advantage of the outer rings in transportation improvement can counterbalance or even outweigh the negative effect of the increase in u.
Improvement of suburban roads and the increasing use of private cars has shortened commuting time from the outer zones, while commuting time from the inner zones has actually increased due to congestion caused by the increase in traffic volumes. Thus growth in suburban zones has been boosted sufficiently to offset the effects of deterioration there. No such boost has been given to the inner ring, which continues to decay and deteriorate.
RESERVATIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
The model presented in this paper involves a number of restrictions, including the following:
1. The depreciation is age-independent. 2. The level of service of the transportation system is exogeneous. Both the congestion effect and investment in improving transportation service are ignored.
3. The urban population is assumed to be homogeneous. 4. Increasing returns to scale and economies of agglomeration in the production of the composite good are ignored.
5. The city layout is unrealistic. 6. City residents are assumed to live on their current wage and all landlords are absentees.
Extending the model to remove restrictions 5 and 6 is not very difficult. We can assume, for example, that city residents earn 1T(t) nonwage income per period. This sum is exogenous to the city, since it is nationally determined (otherwise we cannot assume that the national urban population is homogeneous). The effect of exogenously determined profits is similar to that of w(t); therefore its introduction does not complicate the analysis.
Extending the model to remove restriction 4 will eliminate the absolute independence of the development in a particular zone from the development of the city as a whole. Some of the conclusions regarding the relation between the competitive allocation and optimality will no longer hold. Extension of the model to include economies of scale and agglomeration can be carried out along the lines suggested for a static case by Hochman [11] . With an appropriate government subsidy, financed by a tax on land rent, the optimum allocation can be achieved. The resulting dynamic analysis will not change, except that when the economy is in a steady state N(t) < 0 w ii(t) < 0. The effect of changes in w(t) was discussed in Section 5.
Much more intriguing is the extension of the model to remove restrictions 1-3. For example, with the introduction of congestion and investment in transportation, the separability of this model to independent zones is completely lost and with it much of the simplicity of the analysis. We leave this extension, among others, for separate study.
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